Showing posts with label double dissolution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label double dissolution. Show all posts

Friday, April 15, 2016

Could an election be called next week?

Could an election be called next week? It is possible but may not be probable. It will depend on whether the Senate suspends itself and the response of the Government to that suspension.

Is a suspension of the Senate likely?

Technically, it would be easy for Labor, the Greens and the crossbenchers to suspend the Senate after it had been recalled on 18 April. I explored this possibility in a previous blog post.

But these stalling tactics would come with political costs in the form of reputational damage to Labor. With Labor looking remarkably good for a first term opposition, my guess is that they would not want to risk that reputation on suspending the Senate. Indeed, Labor may be willing to quickly reject the ABCC legislation for a second time so that it does not attract much media attention.

At this point, my guess is that a suspension of the Senate is unlikely.

What would the Government do if the Senate is suspended?

However, if I am wrong and the Senate is suspended, then the question becomes how would Malcolm Turnbull react. Among many possible options, four obvious ones appear to be:
  1. Abandon the double dissolution election plan, and aim for a normal election in August or September
  2. Recall the Senate again for 3 May to consider the Budget, and then move to a double dissolution election of 2 July
  3. Continue with the plan, aiming to get a supply Budget through the Senate on 10 and 11 May and then a double dissolution election on 2 July
  4. Go to an early double dissolution election

Option 1 - Abandon the plan

By suspending the Senate, the non-government parties would be flagging an intent to stall Budget supply beyond the critical 11 May date - the last day on which a double dissolution can be called - and deny Malcolm Turnbull a double dissolution election.

In this scenario, and faced with this level of determination from the non-government parties, the Prime Minister might concede their tactical advantage. He would acknowledge that the non-government parties can use parliamentary tactics to prevent a double dissolution on 2 July, and he would get on with the business of delivering government until a normal election in the second half of 2016.

I think this scenario unlikely. It would see an enormous tactical loss to the Prime Minister.

Option 2 - Recall the Senate for a May 3 Budget

Under this scenario, the Prime Minister would bank the suspended Senate as a double dissolution trigger. By suspending the Senate the non-government parties had ensured the ABCC legislation failed to pass for a second time.

He would then move to the next step of his plan: ensuring there is fiscal supply from 1 July 2016. Without supply (ie budget legislation that givers the government money to pay its bills), much of the business of government would stop. Without the guarantee of supply, the Governor General is unlikely to grant a double dissolution.

The weakness with this option is obvious. What the Senate has done once, it might be willing to do again. The option offers no more certainty of a double dissolution election on 2 July. And it leaves open the possibility of a huge loss of face for the Prime Minister.

Option 3 - Continue with the current plan

The third option is for the Prime Minister to ignore the Senate. He would continue with the plan, aiming to get a supply Budget through the Senate on 10 and 11 May and then call a double dissolution election for 2 July.

Like the previous option the Prime Minister could bank a double dissolution trigger. But also like the previous option, it offers no certainty of a double dissolution election on 2 July. It also comes with the same reputational risks for the Prime Minister.

Option 4 - Go to an early double dissolution

If none of the above options can guarantee a double dissolution election on 2 July, and if all result in reputational damage for the Prime Minister: What else can he do?

One option would be to go for an early double dissolution election - some time in May 2016 - with the aim of having the new Parliament sitting in the last week of June to pass a supply Budget.

There are downsides. First, the Senate election would not benefit from the Senate reforms agreed to by the Parliament in its autumn sittings. The Senate election would be subject to the preference whisperers, and hitherto unheard of minor parties are likely to be elected with half a percentage point of primary vote support. Second, if the Senate's duration would be reckoned from 1 July 2015, and a fresh half-Senate election would be needed within two years, and a year before the next House of Representatives election.

There is also an issue of timing. For a Saturday election, the parliament must be dissolved and writs issued no later than the Tuesday 33 days prior. This means (for example) if the Senate suspended itself on Monday 18 April, the double dissolution election could be held on Saturday 21 May. However, if the suspension does not occur until (say) Wednesday 20 April, the earliest an election could be called in Saturday 28 May.

The related timing issue is the duration of the Senate count. Typically the Senate count can be completed in under four weeks (for smaller states it can take less than three weeks from the election). This would (just) allow the Senate to sit in the last week of June and pass supply. However, when there is a recount as happened in the recent 2013 WA Senate election, the final declared result was not known for 58 days (almost 2 months). This result was subsequently overturned in the courts and a fresh WA Senate election was held.

The potential duration of the Senate count might make this option unpalatable. It might even give the Governor General reason to pause in his consideration of the Prime Minister's request for a double dissolution. But ultimately, given most counts can be completed quickly, and this should not be too much of a deterrent.

Conclusion

A double dissolution election could be called next week. But it is only likely to happen if the Senate suspends itself after being recalled on 18 April.

Such an election would be seen as a second best option. It would put the next election for the House of Representatives out of sync with the half-Senate election (necessitating an early House election or a separate half-Senate election). It would also be subject to the current voting arrangements and the possibility of micro-parties being elected with half a per cent of the primary vote.

Nonetheless, second best might be all that is on offer if the Senate suspends itself.

Thursday, March 24, 2016

DD: the "it's simply not happening" case

This evening Crown Bet is paying $1.27 for a double dissolution election, and $3.50 for a normal election. In probability terms, the betting market believes that there is a 73 per cent probability of a double dissolution.

I am not convinced. As much as the Government may want it, the Achilles' heal in these plans is supply.

Without legislation to spend money, from 1 July 2016 there will be no salaries for public servants, nor indeed their masters, the politicians. There will be no funds for the Defence Force.  No funds for Border Force. No funds for diplomats. And while pensions are covered by special appropriations, there will be no funds for the Centrelink staff to pay those pensions. Much of the ordinary business of government will grind to a halt. Furthermore, without supply guaranteed, the Governor General is unlikely to grant a double dissolution.

So those elements of the Senate that are hostile to the Government have a substantial bargaining chip in delaying the passage of supply bills. Labor, the Greens and the disgruntled cross-benchers can easily band together to stall things such that a double dissolution does not occur.

Let's look at this scenario in some detail.

The first business of the recalled Senate on 18 April 2016 could be to adjourn proceedings to the previously planned next sitting day of 10 May 2016.  It is a little tricky. The Senate would first need to agree to suspend standing order 53, which says that only a Minister can move an adjournment motion. Once suspended (and the Government does not have the numbers in the Senate to prevent this), anyone could move an adjournment of business to 10 May. Furthermore the motion could withdraw any power the President of the Senate might otherwise have to recall the Senate before 10 May.

Yes the motion could be defeated by the Government going back to the Governor General with another instrument under section 5 of the Constitution to prorogue parliament and recall it to sit (say) later that day or the next day. However, this could descend into high farce, with the Governor General repeatedly establishing a session of Parliament where the Senate quickly proceeded to adjourn itself. It would be undignified, and would not reflect well on the institutions of Parliament nor Prime Minister.

Yes, such adjournments would create a double dissolution trigger in respect of the Australian Building and Construction Commission. But with a little more tactical agreement, it is a trigger the Government could not use.

It would be immaterial that the House of Representatives met on Tuesday 3 May and passed supply bills. Those bills would effectively only arrive in the Senate on Tuesday 10 May. On their arrival, the hostile elements in the Senate could simply talk them out - filibuster - and delay consideration of the supply bills until after 11:59:59 pm on the evening of Wednesday 11 May. At this point the Governor General can no longer grant a double dissolution.

Last week the Senate gave us an able demonstration of its capacity to filibuster and delay the consideration of bills. Furthermore, while some Senators may not actually consider voting against supply bills, they would happily delay their passage until (say) Thursday 12 May, when it is too late to call a double dissolution. No one would be harmed, and the normal business of government would be funded from 1 July 2016 (perhaps with the need for the full Budget bills to be passed before 30 November 2016).

Having established that it is technically possible for those Senators hostile to the Government to frustrate a double dissolution, it is important to ask whether it is politically feasible. How would the public react to such maneuverings in order to achieve a tactical process victory over Malcolm Turnbull? It would highlight concerns with the legitimacy of Senators sitting on less than 1 per cent of the popular vote. It could also damage the Labor and Greens brands and any demonstrations those parties would try to mount for responsible governance. But equally it could be seen as over-reach by the Turnbull Government, seeking to impose its will on the democratically elected and (some would argue) more representative Senate.

Make no mistake, the government's determination to get to a double dissolution is a high risk plan that could easily be defeated should Labor, the Greens, the grumpy and the grizzled unite. Given the job losses a number of cross-benchers face with a double dissolution, they might just be motivated enough to give effect to a plan like that outlined above. 

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

DD Redux

The Government has two broad options with the possible double dissolution, each with its own challenges:

  • Go early (ie. a DD-election on or before 1 July),
    • Pros: no need for a long election campaign, and if the DD is held early enough (say in April), the Government can leave the problem of getting a supply budget for 2016-17 until the last week of June and a new parliament.
    • Cons: the Senate term will be reckoned from 1 July 2015 and will result in a Senate with around two years before a half Senate election is needed (a full year before the next House of Representatives election is needed); or
  • Go late (ie. a DD-election on 2 July or thereafter), 
    • Pros: the Senate term will be reckoned from 1 July 2016, and will effectively align the next half Senate election with the next election for the House of Representatives.
    • Cons: because the last day for calling a DD is 11 May, it will be a long election period;  it will be impossible if the Government cannot secure a supply budget for 2016-17 through what looks like an increasingly hostile Senate; and if the Senate count goes beyond 11 August, ministers who are senators will need to resign their ministerial positions. 
Yesterday, the Senate has indicated that it will not be recalled a week early to consider a supply budget. And I suspect there is no guarantee that it would would pass supply bills on 10 May when it next sits. In which case, I doubt there can be a 2 July (or later) double dissolution. It would be reckless to ask for and for the Governor General to grant a double dissolution without a supply budget for 2016-17.

This then brings back on to the table the question of an early double dissolution in say late April. My suspicion is that an early DD (with all the pain of a shortened subsequent Senate term) can only be worthwhile if the government can bring on and have rejected (or at least have the Senate refuse to consider) its legislation for an Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC). If this does not happen before Thursday this week, I suspect the early DD option is also off the table.

Without a double dissolution, the normal election timing would see a Federal election on a Saturday on or after 6 August, in the second half of 2016.

Links

I previously wrote about double dissolution options for the current Parliament on:

Sunday, February 21, 2016

The 2 July DD option

At the start of this year, I blogged on the mechanics of a double dissolution election. At the time I concluded it was possible but not a certainty. In my mind I gave it a probability less than 50 per cent - I saw it somewhere between a 25% and 33% probability.

Since then there has been quite a bit of chatter suggesting a 2 July double dissolution. For example:
  • Antony Green reported Malcolm Turnbull told the party room on 2 February that a double dissolution is a 'live option'
  • Malcolm Turnbull defended the legitimacy of the double dissolution option on Insiders on 7 February. 
  • On 11 February, the Courier Mail suggested there is evidence for the Government considering a 2 July double dissolution election. 
  • In the Australian on 18 November, Nikki Savvas said, "There is still a slim possibility Turnbull, the day after the budget, will call a double-dissolution election for July."
  • On 19 February, Cabinet Minister Pyne confirmed that a double dissolution is a live option.

This chatter, and the discussion of a particular date, has forced me to revise upwards the likelihood of a double dissolution. In this post I will work through the key factors as I now see them.

Tactical chatter

First, however, we should not dismiss the possibility that the chatter is simply or mostly tactical. The argument is that the passage of the legislation stalled in the Senate is the Government's prime objective. The Government is using the double dissolution chatter to pressure the resolve of the cross-benches to pass the stalled legislation. If there is a double dissolution, the cross-benches will face an election after two years in the Senate rather than the usual six; and it could be an election where micro-parties face a new primary-vote threshold requirement for the first time.

If the Government's objective is tactical, the success of this approach depends on the perceived credibility of the Government's statements. For the cross-benches to vote for the stalled legislation, they will need to believe that the Government is not bluffing.

It also worth noting that a tactical objective does not preclude a double dissolution. It is not inconsistent for the Government to have a preference to allow the Parliament to run its full term; but at the same time be willing to call a double dissolution election should its legislation remain stalled.

Campaign length

I covered 2016 electing timing extensively in my earlier post. A 2 July double dissolution election is technically possible. The dissolution would need to occur on or before 11 May. It would result in at least a 52 day election campaign (seven and a half weeks), significantly longer than the 33 day minimum provided for in the Constitution (just under 5 weeks).

The conventional wisdom, since the ten-week 1984 election campaign, is that long election campaigns do not favour the government of the day. While then Prime Minister Hawke won the 1984 election, the swing against his Government was larger than most analysts expected. Many attributed the size of he swing to the length of the campaign.

On balance, the long campaign period necessary for a 2 July election suggests a double dissolution is less likely.

Senate terms

While a long-election campaign might mitigate against a double dissolution, an election after 1 July deals with a key problem with holding a double dissolution. Under section 13 of our Constitution, the terms of a Senator following a double dissolution shall be taken to begin on the first day of July preceding the day of his election.If the election was held in (say) June, the date of effect of those Senate seats would be backdated to 1 July 2015. The subsequent half-Senate election would need to be called by May 2018, while the House of Representatives would be able to continue until mid 2019. The next government will either need to decide on an early synchronised election in the first half of 2018, or allow House and half-Senate elections to get out of sync from 2018 onward.

On balance, a double dissolution election on 2 July is more likely than an earlier double dissolution election. If the Government is leanings towards having a double dissolution, a 2 July election would be among the more likely dates.

Senate voting reform

According to media reports, the government appears to have negotiated a Senate voting reform proposal with the Greens and Senator Xenaphon. According to reports, voters will be required to preference vote for only six parties above the line. This six-preference limit would curtail micro-party preference harvesting.

If the Government can secure support for Senate voting reform, it should make the Senate more workable for the Coalition (there would be fewer micro-parties to negotiate with). It may even benefit the Coalition at the polls (but nothing like the extent that was reported this week drawing on work from Graham Askey and Peter Breen).

Senate reform should mitigate the usual problem of the lower quota at a double dissolution resulting in more cross-bench Senators being elected. A normal half-Senate election in the second half of 2016, even with Senate voting reform, would see Senators Wang, Lazarus, Lambie and Muir continue in the Senate unto 30 June 2020.

On balance, if the Government can enact legislation for Senate reform before 11 May, it increases the likelihood of a double dissolution. A double dissolution with Senate voting reform would most likely only see the Coalition, Labor, the Greens and Senator Xenaphon's supporters remain in the Senate.

The Budget

Perhaps the most challenging question for the Government is its operating Budget for the 2016-17 financial year. Without a Budget passed by Parliament, the Government will not be able to pay the wages of public servants nor pay for community services from 1 July. Pensioners would be protected, as they are paid under special appropriations that do not need to be renewed each year through the Budget process. But without a Budget, it is unlikely that the Governor-General would agree to grant a double dissolution election for 2 July.

It is likely the Government has thought about this problem, and it is entirely possible that the negotiations for Senate Reform also include an agreement to pass a supply budget in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The passage of a supply Budget could occur in the last week of the Autumn sittings (15-17 March), or on the first sitting day of the Winter sittings (10 May). A supply budget would give the Government 5 or 6 months of funds (simply replicating the 2015-16 Budget), with the expectation that a full budget would be brought to Parliament in August or September 2016.

Nonetheless political risks remain. Labor could argue that Turnbull Government is not telling the voters what services it plans to cut or the taxes it plans to raise. While these matters would be covered during the election campaign, the absence of a normal May Budget gives Labor a front-foot start to the election campaign. The alternative of exposing the full proposed Budget for 2016-17 prior to the election being called allows its less palatable elements to be picked over in the glare of an election campaign. The per-election economic and fiscal outlook statement would serve a similar role to the Budget-papers, updating the Government's fiscal position and forward estimates.

If the Government has done a deal to ensure the passage of the supply bills through the Senate. the need for a Budget should not impact on the likelihood of double dissolution. Without such an agreement, a 2 July double dissolution is unlikely.

The "trigger" Bills

The list of double dissolution triggers has one important change since the beginning of the year. The Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Bill 2013 [No. 2] has been introduced into the Senate for a second time. The failure of the Senate to pass this Bill is likely to be the centerpiece of the Government's argument for a double dissolution.

The fact this Bill was reintroduced on 4 February increases the likelihood of there being a double dissolution.

School holidays

If an election was held on 2 July, the NT, Qld and Vic would be in the middle of their school holidays. ACT, NSW, Tas and WA would be at the start of their school holidays.

Because school holidays can see large numbers traveling, lower voter turnout, and some dissatisfaction with the government for calling an election that interrupts holiday plans, governments often avoid calling elections during school holidays.

In this case, the planned school holidays make a double dissolution on 2 July less likely.

Conclusion 

When I blogged at the beginning of the year, I thought a double dissolution election possible but unlikely. In my mind I gave it a probability of 25 to 33 per cent.

With the ongoing chatter around a double dissolution, the re-introduction of the Building and Construction Industry (Improving Productivity) Bill 2013, the rumoured passage of Senate voting reform, and the focus on an election date that does not give rise to an out-of-sync half-Senate election, I have re-evaluated the likelihood of a double dissolution.

Mediating my assessment are the length of the double dissolution election campaign, the way a Budget-free double dissolution could support a Labor narrative that the Government does not have an economic plan, the logistics for securing a supply Budget, Senate voting reform may still fall over, the timing of school holidays, and the cross-bench Senators might just blink and pass the Bills stalled in the Senate without a double dissolution.

On balance, I now estimate the probability of a double dissolution election to be somewhere between a 40 and 50 per cent probability. Still less likely than more likely; but significantly more likely than I thought at the beginning of January.

Updates

I have corrected the school holidays.

Saturday, January 2, 2016

A double dissolution?

The government's ascendancy in the opinion polls and the final report of the Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption has fuelled speculation on the possibility of an early double dissolution election. In this post I will look at some of the factors the government will need to consider in deciding whether to go for a double dissolution, and the timing of the subsequent election. We will begin our consideration with a discussion of normal election practice and timing.

What would be normal election practice and timing?

Australia has a maximum three-year term for the Federal House of Representatives. The three years is reckoned from the first sitting day of the House following the previous election. Following the 7 September 2013 election, the House first sat on 12 November 2013. While the government can call an election earlier, it cannot extend the life of the current House beyond 11 November 2016. An election must be held on a Saturday between 33 and 68 days after the house has been dissolved.

In practice, governments over the past 45 years have sought to synchronise elections for the House of Representatives with half-Senate elections. The Senate has six-year fixed terms for state Senators, with half of the state Senate seats up for election every three years. There are different rules for the election of territory-Senators, which do not affect the timing of elections. The last time Australia had a half-Senate election that was out-of-sync with an election for the House of Representatives was in 1970. Out-of-sync half senate elections allow (perhaps encourage) the public to express dissatisfaction with the government of the day, without changing the government. This can make the task of government for the incumbent very difficult.

Synchronising the House of Representative and half-Senate elections necessitates an election date on a Saturday somewhere between 6 August 2016 and 14 January 2017. As school holidays and major sporting events are typically avoided, the latest an election is likely to be held is 10 December 2016. The school holidays would suggest the period 17 September to 15 October 2015 is unlikely.  The 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics may preclude 6 August to 20 August 2016 (and perhaps the immediate Saturdays following). The AFL Grand Final is Friday 30 September and the NRL Grand Final is on Sunday 2 October, both of which provide an additional reason not to have an election on Saturday 1 October 2015.

In the normal scheme of things, the next Australian Federal election would in all likelihood happen on one of the following dates in in the second half of 2016: the first two Saturdays of September (3 and 10), the last two Saturdays of October (22 and 29), any Saturday in November (5, 12, 19 and 26), or the first two Saturdays of December (3 and 10). The earlier dates are more likely than the later dates.

What is a double dissolution?

Under the Australian Constitution, both houses of Parliament have almost equal legislative power (noting that the House of Representatives has supremacy when it comes to proposing legislation that spends money or raises taxes).

While a government must have the confidence of the House of Representatives, it may only have a minority of support in the Senate. The current government does not have a majority in the Senate.The absence of a government majority in the Senate can result in legislative disagreements between the House of Representatives and the Senate.

If there is an ongoing legislative disagreement between these two houses of Parliament, section 57 of the Australian Constitution provides the government with a mechanism to break that disagreement. This section allows for a fresh election following the dissolution of both houses of Parliament in the circumstance where the Senate twice rejects or fails to pass legislation passed by the lower house at least three months apart.

This deadlock-resolution mechanism allows for the complete re-election of the entire Senate at a timing of the government's choice, as opposed to electing half of the Senate sometime within the 12 month period prior to the expiration of the half-Senate. If the government wins a double dissolution, and the Senate further rejects the legislative proposals, the government can call a joint sitting of both houses to pass the legislation.

There have been six double dissolution elections since Federation: in 1914, 1951, 1974, 1975, 1983 and 1987. There has only been one joint sitting; in 1975, following the 1974 double dissolution.

When can a double dissolution be called?

A number of preconditions must be satisfied before a government can ask the Governor-General for a double dissolution. First, the government must have proposed laws that were passed twice in the House of Representatives, in the same session or consecutive sessions of Parliament, but these proposed laws have been rejected by or failed to pass the Senate twice (at least three months apart). According to this Australian Parliament House web-site: there are currently two existing and thirteen potential legislative triggers for a double dissolution. The two triggers are the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (Abolition) Bill 2013 and the Fair Work (Registered Organisations) Amendment Bill 2014

The second precondition is that a double dissolution cannot be granted within six months of the dissolution of the House of Representatives by the effluxion of time. In effect, this means the last day a double dissolution can be granted is on 11 May 2016. The last possible date for a double dissolution election is Saturday 16 July 2016.

Another factor the government will need to consider is its operating budget. Typically a government introduces its full Budget legislation in May each year, with passage through both houses of Parliament by 30 June. If the government calls a double dissolution election it will either need to secure the Budget for 2016-17 before the election, or allow enough time for a supply budget between when Parliament resumes and the start of the new financial year on 1 July 2016. A supply budget typically allows for 5 months of government spending from 1 July, in anticipation of full Budget legislation being introduced in August and passed by November. The last time Australia had a supply Budget was in 1996, following the 2 March 1996 election.

Securing a supply Budget from a hostile Senate before a double dissolution is not guaranteed and may prove challenging. Furthermore, the Governor-General may not grant a double dissolution if there would be insufficient time for Parliament to pass a supply Budget after an election but before the new financial year commences on 1 July 2016. If you allow the minimum 33 days to hold an election and three weeks for the Senate count, a week for writs to be returned, and one week (from 27 June to 30 June 2016) for the new Parliament to pass a supply Budget; then the latest possible date for a double dissolution is Monday 25 April, with an election on Saturday 28 May 2016. However this timetable is heroic, and an earlier double dissolution election is more plausible than the latest possible date.

Only one of the existing triggers for a double dissolution is electorally appealing (to the government's core constituency). If the government is looking to a double dissolution I would expect further electorally advantageous potential triggers (from the Coalition's perspective) to be reintroduced into the Senate in February 2016. In particular, riffing off the Trade Unions Royal Commission, I would expect the bills on the building construction industry to be re-introduced.

School holidays may also inform the timing of a double dissolution election. Avoiding school holidays around the country would preclude an election between Saturday 26 March and Saturday 30 April.

Because of the Budget constraint noted above, I would expect any double dissolution election would be held no later than mid-May, allowing the Parliament to reconvene in June and pass a supply Budget. We can rule out a double dissolution on Saturday 26 March (Easter) and on Saturday 23 April (which is adjacent to a Monday ANZAC Day).

May 7 and 14 would appear to be the most likely dates for a double dissolution election (with the double dissolution occurring on 4 or 11 April 2016). Early election dates in March, would not give the government sufficient time in February to amass electorally propitious triggers and meet the minimum 33 day requirement between calling and holding the election. Election dates in late March and April clash with school holidays. Late May election dates would put pressure on the passage of a supply Budget for the 2016-17 financial year.

Any reasons not to go to a double dissolution?

Notwithstanding the government's ascendancy in the opinion polls, there are some reasons the government may not chose a double dissolution. The first is that a double dissolution increases the likelihood of minor parties being elected to the Senate. In a normal half-Senate election, the quota for a Senate seat is 1 / (6 + 1) = 14.3 per cent of the vote. In a double dissolution, the Senate quota is 1 / (12 + 1) = 7.7 per cent of the vote.

The second reason the government may not wish to proceed with a double dissolution is that it has not introduced reforms to Senate voting following the 2013 election. On 9 May 2014, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters tabled its report entitled Interim report on the inquiry into the conduct of the 2013 Federal Election: Senate voting practices. This report proposed a number of reforms, some of which would make it significantly more difficult for micro-parties to be elected to the Senate. The government has not formally responded to the report; although in September 2015 the then Special Minister of State, Mal Brough, indicated that the government had plans to reform Senate voting.

A third issue is that a double dissolution election in the first half of 2016, with Senators elected before 1 July 2016, would see the date of effect of those Senate seats being backdated to 1 July 2015 (section 13 of the Australian Constitution refers). The subsequent half-Senate election would need to be called by May 2018, while the House of Representatives would be able to continue until mid 2019. The government will either need to decide on an early synchronised election in the first half of 2018, or allow House and half-Senate elections to get out of sync from 2018 onward.

While I think each of these reasons sufficiently strong to cause reflection, I do not consider them strong enough to automatically veto the consideration of a double dissolution election.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think a double dissolution is a distinct possibility. The government's ascendancy in the opinion polls and the final report of Trade Union Royal Commission provide the government with both the motivation and political cover for an early double dissolution election.

However, if the government decides on a double dissolution, it would want the Senate to reject more potential laws for a second time, if the government is to maximise this potential benefit of a subsequent joint sitting. We will get an indication of the government's intention when Parliament resumes on 2 February 2016.

If a double dissolution election is called, it is likely to happen in early April for an election in the first half of May. Any earlier, and there would be insufficient time to accumulate further legislative triggers, and/or clashes with school holidays. Any later, and the government may have a Budget problem from 1 July 2016.

While a double dissolution is a distinct possibility, it is not a certainty. It would increase the representation of minor parties in the Senate. It would be held without the advantage of Senate voting reform. And it would likely see a two-year (rather than three-year) subsequent term for the House of Representatives.

Updates

This post was updated on 3 January 2016 to account for school holidays in the first half of 2016.